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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that current research on carbon regulation neglects the complex 
interactions of institutional norms and market behaviour that characterise responses to 
regulatory change. We draw on empirical research undertaken with English housebuilders and 
housing market stakeholders to examine how transitional pathways toward a low carbon 
housing future might be advanced and consider the implications of such for carbon regulation 
and low carbon economies. Our core proposition is that carbon regulation research can no 
longer ignore the impact of institutionally-constituted market behaviour in shaping pathways 
and transitions towards low carbon futures. 
 
1.! Introduction 
The growth of global concern over the anthropogenic impacts of climate change has done much 
to narrow the focus of environmental concern from the broad idealism of sustainable 
development to a preoccupation with the management of carbon cycles. The challenge that lies 
ahead is a significant one. According to Kennedy and Sgouridis (2011) addressing planetary 
CO2 limits (stabilisation of 350 parts per million) will require the developed world to cut 
carbon emissions by around 95%. Whilst there is evidence of a slowing in overall global 
emissions (DECC, 2016) certain regions remain dominant sources of CO2 production and have, 
as a result, had to review the efficacy of interventions centred on carbon efficiency. In the latest 
update published by the EUJRC (2015), the EU was found to account for 10% of global outputs 
with the US and China accounting for 15% and 30% respectively. The main focus of attention 
within these regions has, unsurprisingly, been on the built environment (Gill et al., 2007; 
Bulkeley et al., 2010; Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Hodson et al., 2013; Carter et al., 2015). 
Rydin (2013) attributes this not only to the potential impact that decisions regarding design and 
construction of individuals buildings might have on carbon reduction, but also the role played 
by urban layout and associated travel choices. 
In response, a persuasive body of literature has emerged which has attempted to indicate the 
contribution that specific modes of intervention might achieve within the built environment 
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(see for example: Pataki et al., 2006; Dhakal and Betsill, 2007; Metz et al., 2007; Shukla et al., 
2008; Dhakal, 2010; Li et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2013). This work has contributed to the 
modelling of carbon futures through the use of scenario-based tools and has identified the range 
of technical solutions that might ease the carbon crisis. In parallel, state-level actors have 
advanced a plethora of regulatory and policy-based mechanisms geared towards meeting 
ambitious reduction targets to be delivered by non-state actors (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Geels, 
2014). To a certain extent, these trends represent a positive move towards addressing climatic 
impacts, yet they also raise important questions about realisation and effectiveness. We argue 
that one of the problems of achieving a low carbon economy is that much of the language of 
carbon reduction is couched in terms of ÔpotentialÕ and ÔexpectationÕ. Whilst scenario-based 
approaches and technical solutions tell us what might be possible, they do not necessarily 
indicate how they will be realised in practice. Similarly, state responses based on mobilising 
this knowledge do not always acknowledge the complexities and realities of non-state actors, 
particularly those that are market facing. 
One of the key challenges facing market-based actors in the built environment is that they are 
increasingly being expected to operate within an uncertain institutional setting characterised 
by the emergence of hybrid forms of governance. Whilst attempts by the state to focus reforms 
and targets around particular sectors or institutional pathways can be seen as characteristic of 
what some authors have referred to as eco-state restructuring (While et al., 2010; Goodchild 
and Walshaw, 2011), it can also be argued that an expectation that downstream actors will 
deliver market viable innovation retains much of the socio-technical optimism enshrined in 
ecological modernisation (Huber, 1982; Janicke, 1984, 1986; Simonis, 1988). Here, despite the 
presence of a harder-edged form of regulatory control, there is an assumption that non-state 
actors can achieve outcomes that are compatible both for the environment and the economy. 
This places such actors in a challenging position. Whilst on the one hand they are being co-
opted into new institutional pathways with clear behavioural limits, they are also being 
positioned as the drivers of innovation. In this sense, their power in the low carbon economy 
is being enhanced and constrained at the same time. If the shift towards low carbon governance 
is to succeed, then this hybrid form of governance will need to overcome the criticism of blind 
idealism previously levelled at ecological modernisation (Hannigan, 1995; Janicke, 2008). 
This challenge is likely to be acutely felt by the speculative1  housebuilding industry. As 
buildings and their occupiers are notable contributors to global carbon emissions (Dhakal 2009; 
Williams, 2012), housing markets have become one of several sectors targeted for regulatory 
attention. Approaches have become increasingly target-centred and have attempted to achieve 
transformation though influencing building design and construction, occupational behaviour, 
energy generation and infrastructure provision (Glaeser and Kahn, 2010). However, due to the 
vulnerability and institutional complexity associated with housing markets (Adams et al., 2005), 
it is likely that housing market actors will find the transition to a low carbon economy 
                                                             
1 The term ÔspeculativeÕ in this context refers to activity by housebuilders based on an assumption of the risk of 
loss in return for the uncertain possibility of reward, through profit and saleability of product (Payne, 2013) 
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particularly challenging. Housing markets are inherently unstable, fragmented and subject to 
competing priorities surrounding functional utility, short and long-term value and investment 
return (Pacione, 2013). As such, the ability of emerging regulation to deliver solutions that are 
compatible for both the environment and the market will require sensitivity toward the dynamic 
nature of institutional structures and processes. 
In this paper, we address these issues of institutional complexity. Our aim is to explore how 
institutionally-constituted market behaviours shape pathways for transition towards low carbon 
futures. By drawing on the English GovernmentÕs attempt to introduce a zero carbon target for 
new homes (ZCH), we seek to explore the extent to which market-facing actors within the built 
environment are adequately positioned to respond to increasing levels of state regulation 
centered on carbon reduction. The target, introduced by the Labour Government in 2006, aimed 
to ensure that all new homes would be carbon neutral by 2016 (DCLG, 2006a). It was supported 
by the Code for Sustainable Homes (CSH) (DCLG, 2006b) and later by an allowable solutions 
mechanism geared toward partial off-site monetary contributions (Zero Carbon Hub, 2011). 
Although the ZCH target was in line with the ambitions of both the 2008 UK Climate Change 
Act (CCA, 2008) and the more recent EU Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings 
(European Commission, 2010), it was ultimately scrapped by the Conservative Government in 
2015 (HM Treasury, 2015). Faced with concerns over feasibility from the outset (RICS, 2016), 
both the ZCH target and the supporting delivery apparatus were significantly modified over a 
ten-year period. We show these modifications in Table 2. We suggest this process of revision 
and ultimate retreat provides a rich opportunity to understand how gradual state-level policy 
repositioning impacted upon perceived opportunities and constraints for institutional reform in 
the housing market. This, in turn, affords us the opportunity to establish unique insights into 
the complexity of market behaviour in the low carbon transition.  
The paper is structured into seven sections. After the introduction, we problematize the low 
carbon transition for market-led housing systems, drawing on the English example. We then 
consider those theoretical perspectives that assist us in understanding how a shift in approach 
may be achieved and present a novel analytical framework centred on three dominant lines of 
enquiry: clarity of expectation; change mobilisation; and, constraint management. We then 
outline the methodological approach taken and present the results structured around our three 
dominant lines of enquiry: clarity, change and constraint. Following this, we discuss the results 
and finally, we conclude with our contribution to knowledge and our recommendations for 
future regulatory interventions in market-led housing systems associated with carbon reduction. 
 
2.! A contested transition?  
A number of authors have argued that a fundamental modification of conventional market 
operations will be required to achieve regulatory compliance for a zero carbon future. This is 
said to be necessary in the traditional practices and institutional pathways of a number of key 
market actors (Meadowcroft 2005; Osmani and OÕReilly, 2009). Hodson and Marvin (2013) 
note that the drive for low carbon futures within the housing sector is especially challenging 
due to the lack of pre-existing markets for zero carbon homes. Such markets, it is argued, will 
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need to be actively constructed as a basis for creating new spaces of market demand, R&D 
activity, technological capability, consumer acceptance and financial feasibility. On this basis, 
some authors have suggested that tackling energy efficiency issues will require Ôa step change 
in the housing construction processÕ (Osmani and OÕReilly, 2009, p. 4), with an entrepreneurial 
response by market actors necessary to create new market opportunities and make consumers 
amenable to a new generation of low carbon homes (Hodson and Marvin, 2013). Yet, the 
inherently conservative and highly tuned business model of speculative housebuilders (Payne, 
2013; 2015) raises questions over both the necessity and capacity of housebuilders to achieve 
a form of regulatory compliance that is both technically and commercially acceptable. Whilst 
the business model is typically dependent on product and process standardisation (Gibb, 1999; 
Nicol and Hooper, 1999; Payne, 2013), it has to date provided limited evidence of technical 
and material innovation (Ball, 1999; Adams and Payne, 2011; Payne and Barker, 2015). 
Central to the problem faced by market-led housing systems is that the environment has 
historically been considered a zero-priced resource. This is largely because it has no supply 
cost and monetary values have not been placed on environmental goods in housing (Bhatti, 
2001, p. 43). Although recent research has explored the way in which the housing market may 
ÔvalueÕ the environmental resources it uses (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Smith, 2010; Mell et 
al., 2016), mainly through attaching a positive value (Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000; Gibbons et 
al., 2014) and measuring a willingness to pay (Mell et al., 2016), these approaches are targeted 
towards the consumer and it is possible that unless market forces drive this change, 
housebuilders may find little reason to shift conventional production processes that seek the 
ready realisation of profit margins (Bhatti, 2001; Payne and Barker, 2015). This is likely to be 
particularly true of the speculative housebuilding industry which has, on the whole, 
traditionally adopted a conservative approach to environmental reforms. In this context, it is 
unclear whether speculative housebuilders will respond to policy expectations by seeking to 
absorb market-based incentives or tax reductions within existing institutional arrangements or 
whether they will explore technical innovation (Bhatti, 2001). 
With the above in mind, we suggest that the broad thrust of the StateÕs carbon reduction 
ambitions (Table 2) distils into a number of fundamental technical and market pressure points 
which lay challenge to the traditional modus operandi of the speculative housebuilding industry 
(Table 1). Many of these challenges are linked to concerns over certainty, institutional capacity 
and market responsiveness. Whilst on the one hand there are real concerns over the mainstream 
implementation, regulatory compliance and long term performance and maintenance of these 
largely untested technologies in new buildings (DCLG, 2006a; Power, 2008; Greenwood, 2010; 
McLeod et al., 2012) on the other, there is unease over the time it might take for changing 
consumer preferences to be reflected in price signals (Parag and Darby, 2009) and whether 
lenders and valuers will incorporate environmental premiums in property valuation techniques 
(Lorenz and Lutzkendorf, 2008; Meins et al., 2010; NHBC Foundation, 2012). Whilst there is 
no clear position in the literature on real consumer demand for zero carbon homes, industry 
thinking tends to argue for a more consumer-centric policy framework for encouraging 
consumers to value and pursue energy efficient homes. This could be achieved through 
consistent and effective incentives for industry to invest against in order to create a market for 
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energy efficiency (Zero Carbon Hub, 2010; CBI, 2015). Without such intervention, current 
levels of policy vagueness may leave energy consumers without psychological, social or 
economic motivation to reduce their demand (Parag and Darby, 2009). Overcoming these 
constraints is likely to be made all the more problematic by the prevailing financial and policy 
uncertainty present within the post-recession housing market (Payne, 2015). The search for an 
appropriate form of resolution therefore remains all the more challenging and forms part of 
what Burch (2010) refers to as a critical next step in the development of climate change policy 
and design. The ability of speculative housebuilders to respond to this challenge remains 
untested and is the subject of the empirical interrogation that follows.  
 
Table 1: Institutional pressure points for the speculative housing market in a low 
carbon economy 
Key Challenges 
Technical Market-centred 
 
¥! Bulk of evidence for technical innovation 
drawn from simulations rather than real 
world application (Johnston, Lowe and 
Bell, 2005; Power, 2008). 
¥! Long term performance and maintenance 
implications uncertain (Power, 2008; 
Greenwood, 2010)  
¥! Higher technical standards could increase 
construction costs and exacerbate industry 
risk and uncertainty (DCLG, 2007; 
McLeod et al, 2012). 
¥! Concerns over the existence of required 
skills and knowledge to deliver 
implementation (Greenwood, 2010; 
Heffernan et al., 2012). 
¥! Approaches are in opposition to 
conventional product design and 
construction methods (Ball, 1999; Payne, 
2009; Adams and Payne, 2011; Payne, 
2013). 
 
¥! Uncertainty over whether increased costs 
for low carbon solutions can be recouped 
via higher market values (Meins et al., 
2010; Zero Carbon Hub, 2010). 
¥! Concerns over time-lag for new market 
trends to reflect consumer preferences 
(Meins et al., 2010; Kriese and Scholz, 
2012). 
¥! Precise nature of consumer preferences 
uncertain (Lorenz and Lutzkendorf, 
2008). A more effective policy framework 
may be necessary for encouraging 
consumers to value and pursue energy 
efficient homes (Zero Carbon Hub, 2010; 
CBI, 2015). The weight given to the 
market in delivering demand reduction 
implies that consumers do not need to act 
but to react to market signals (Parag and 
Darby, 2009). 
¥! Valuers and mortgage lenders may be 
reluctant to incorporate a premium for 
sustainable new homes (NHBC 
Foundation, 2012). 
 
 
3.! Theorising a low carbon transition  
In order to explore the extent to which market-facing actors within the built environment are 
adequately positioned to respond to increasing levels of state regulation centred on carbon 
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reduction, we consider those theoretical perspectives which assist in understanding how a shift 
in approach might be achieved. We suggest that whilst these approaches provide a useful entry 
point for unpacking pathways for change, the nature of housing market structures and processes 
means they are better understood in combination rather than isolation. As such we draw on 
those elements we find particularly persuasive in order to establish a thematic criteria for 
empirical analysis. 
The process of achieving change within the environmental policy arena necessitates the 
acknowledgment of technical and material constraints and the links between these and society 
more generally (Elzen et al., 2004; Kemp et al., 2007; Goodchild and Walshaw, 2011). These 
socio-technical relationships have been the subject of a growing body of literature devoted to 
advancing varying forms of transition management theory (Rotmens et al., 2001; Berkhout et 
al., 2004). Central to transition management theory is the recognition that understanding 
change requires a focus upon not only policy goals but upon socio-economic, political and 
cultural complexity (Wilson, 2007). According to Geels (2010), this is necessary due to the 
fact that existing systems (such as those related to housing, energy and transport) display lock-
in mechanisms related to system support (favourable regulatory or subsidy mechanisms), 
existing investments, dominant values and priorities and ultimately, behaviour. Overcoming 
the resistance of these sectoral systems is hence, often an on-going and dynamic process.  
One of the most dominant perspectives to emerge within transition management theory is the 
multi level perspective (MLP) (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2004; Geels and Schott, 2007).  
This approach suggests that transitions from one state to another (also referred to as regime 
shifts) come about through the interaction of three overlapping innovation routes. These levels 
are defined as niches (the focal point of radical innovation), socio-technical regimes (which 
accommodate established practices and sets of rules) and finally, the landscape (the exogenous 
level) (Killip, 2013; Geels, 2014). Typically, these levels map on to micro, meso and macro 
scales (Geels, 2004; Killip, 2013). The manner in which transitions are achieved within this 
approach can vary. Where significant alterations occur at the landscape level (war, 
destabilisation of government, demographic change) dramatic forms of transition can take 
place. More commonly however, the process of transition is both incremental and experimental. 
As such, transitions are more normally dependent on a more fluid linkage between niche and 
regime with a framing role played by the landscape. Geels (2014) describes this as a process 
whereby niche-level innovations build up momentum using approaches varying from social 
learning to price signals. This momentum when accompanied by pressure at the landscape level 
provides the opportunity for regime destabilisation and the breakthrough of socio-technical 
innovation. Whilst the effectiveness of the regime is often characterised by the search for 
pathways of influence (Killip, 2013), the effectiveness of landscape pressure will depend to a 
certain extent on the degree of articulation. Smith et al (2005) for example, have noted that 
successful forms of pressure will require not only a coherent focus but will also need to be 
sufficiently well articulated to promote a response by the regime. This is a key area of 
contestation for the English zero-carbon housing project where target definition and 
governmental coordination have become a source of debate. 
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Despite an initial emphasis within transition management theory on the dynamics of social and 
technical interactions, recent critiques of the approach have pointed to a narrowing of emphasis 
which has tended to assert the potential of technical innovation over and above the 
opportunities and constraints afforded by social and economic realities (Bulkeley, et al., 2014).  
Whilst this has led authors such as Meadowcroft (2009; 2011) and Hess (2014) to argue for the 
repoliticisation of transition management, others have called for greater recognition of spatial 
representation (Bridge et al., 2013), urban exchange (Hodson and Marvin, 2012), social justice 
(Newell and Mulvaney, 2008) and experimentation (Evans and Karvonen, 2011). 
The significance of technical innovation has certainly become a dominant feature of much 
MLP-based research and has come to play a central role in narratives of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation (Kemp, 1998). Such perspectives frequently point to demonstration 
projects and schemes to highlight the potential of emerging technology in existence at the niche 
level. Goodchild and Walshaw (2012) have noted that this is particularly true of debates 
surrounding carbon-based innovations within the housebuilding industry. Examples alluded to 
include the Beddington Zero Energy Development (BedZED) developed by the Peabody Trust 
and the Hockerton earth sheltered scheme in Nottinghamshire. Such schemes are frequently 
presented as examples of the direction that mainstream housebuilding might head. It is arguable 
however, that an emphasis on the transformative potential of demonstration projects within the 
housebuilding industry is overstated. In most cases, the schemes pointed to by advocates of 
low carbon housing are free of market constraints and standard regulatory practice. This 
presents significant challenges for integration by institutions operating at the level of the regime 
(Seyfang 2010). 
Two key responses to the primacy of the niche as a driver of technical innovation are of interest 
to the manner in which the MLP approach might be reframed to contribute to carbon 
transformation within the housebuilding sector. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that the 
niches hold the potential to transcend the straightjacket of technological provision and become 
the basis of knowledge brokerage and social adaptation (Bulkeley, et al., 2014). In this sense, 
niches might be seen as social networks, often drawing on third sector experience, which 
operate on the margins of the mainstream.  By adopting a fluid, and less delineated relationship 
with the regime, they may yield more positive results than can be adopted purely through 
promotion of new products and systems (Boss and Brown, 2012; Bulkeley and Broto, 2013).  
Secondly, there is limited understanding of how the sense of expectation associated with the 
niche can be combined with an appreciation of the complexity of finding pathways for regime 
breakthrough (Schot and Geels, 2008; Killip, 2013).  Geels (2014) in particular, has argued for 
a revisionist perspective on MLP which calls for a greater level of exploration and 
understanding of both the regime and the nature of associated forms of resistance. His argument 
is centred on a concern that most transition scholars fail to pay sufficient attention to existing 
regimes and associated actors or Ôconceptualize regimes as monolithic barriers to be overcomeÕ 
(p. 23).   
These perspectives may potentially serve to re-establish the utility of the MLP perspective in 
informing carbon transitions. However, we argue that in order that niche-level actors may adopt 
a greater role in steering social learning, we first need to appreciate the behavioural 
8 
 
environment which exists at the regime level. Without an appreciation of the characteristics of 
the regime and the roles played by complexity and variation, it is unlikely that opportunities 
for social learning can be triggered. Due to the limited emphasis within the MLP approach on 
regime structures and processes, we suggest an ability to unpack low-carbon transitions within 
the housebuilding industry necessitates the consideration of additional yet complimentary 
perspectives. To do this we draw on theories of new institutionalism. This approach questions 
earlier institutional assumptions that human beings are self- interested, rationally thinking 
actors (March and Olsen, 2009) and concentrates on the historical-institutional context in which 
decisions are made (Jordan et al, 2003). Institutions are taken here to mean Ôa relatively stable 
collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in 
specific situationsÕ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 948). Institutions matter because they are seen 
as Ôdefining opportunity structures and constraints on behaviourÕ as well as being Ôpath-
dependent path-defining complexes of social relationsÕ (Jessop 2001, p. 1217). It is this 
emphasis on institutional context that affords a greater understanding of regime-level housing 
market responses to centrally determined low-carbon targets. This, we suggest, opens up the 
opportunity to critically evaluate how existing institutional configurations condition and shape 
low carbon housing futures to capture the complexity of the transition taking place. 
Of particular interest to us is how new institutionalism enables an understanding of the role of 
embededness. Institutions are characteristically slow to evolve and change and are conditioned 
by an allegiance to established norms and values (Jordan et al, 2003), leading to embedded 
forms of behaviour which can be difficult to change. In this sense, firms do not behave as 
transformers or reformers (Stiglitz 1999). Although institutions are not immutable, they do 
have relatively durable, self-reinforcing and persistent qualities (Hodgson 1998). Institutions 
are ÔstickyÕ and when faced with external pressures, will tend to look inward and backward in 
order to look forward (March and Olsen, 1989).  
Policy change - purposeful change to formal institutions (and sometimes informal institutions) 
by state actors - usually involves institutional change (Needham and Louw, 2006) and is 
overwhelmingly incremental (North, 1990). It can thus be considered as a form of institutional 
design (Alexander, 2005) and should be informed by an understanding of how institutions and 
their constituent actors (including organisations), change and can be changed. As institutions 
frequently default to tried and trusted strategies in the search for continuity (Needham and 
Louw, 2006), authors such as McLeod (1997) and Payne (2013) have suggested that significant 
institutional change is likely to be the result of a sense of partnership and common enterprise 
between the state and market-based actors. Therefore, although institutions may be ÔstickyÕ in 
nature, policy may achieve its intended aims if it acknowledges the presence of institutional 
pathways (Needham and Louw, 2006; Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
Such pathways however are not always readily identifiable. New institutionalist perspectives 
take a strongly disaggregated view of market structures, emphasising the role of context, 
process and social relations in market activity (Adams et al 2005). Previous work on the 
institutional dynamics of housing markets (Payne, 2009; 2013; Adams and Payne, 2011) has 
indicated differentiated institutional responses to state expectations based on existing 
behavioural norms. Payne (2013) for example, in exploring housebuilder responses to UK 
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brownfield development targets, showed that institutional stickiness could be overcome in 
certain instances but was dependent upon the degree of alignment between policy expectation 
and strategic business priorities, institutional relations and the structure of housing provision. 
By leveraging insights from new institutionalism to enrich our understanding of regime-level 
action, our approach overcomes assumptions that reinforce the idea that housing markets and 
their constituent actors are monolithic or homogeneous entities. This allows us to examine 
whether new institutional configurations are developing or whether existing institutional 
interests and configurations can prevail. In turn, our chosen approach enables us to capture the 
complexity of the transition taking place and assess what challenges are being experienced by 
market-facing actors within the low carbon transition. 
From an evaluation of the dominant characteristics of both the multi level perspective (MLP) 
and new institutionalism (NI), we argue that a joint reading of these approaches provides a rich 
and rewarding framework from which to assess pathways to carbon transformation within the 
English speculative housebuilding industry. Central to our joint reading is the recognition that 
whilst transformative change is typically incremental and experimental, it very often takes 
place in a complex environment in which institutions are both embedded and resistant to 
change. Our interpretation of these market-based complexities yielded three dominant lines of 
inquiry. These are summarised as follows: 
1.! Clarity of expectation: The MLP approach asserts that due to the often-competing 
nature of socio-economic, political and cultural forces, the clarity of policy articulation 
is fundamental. Without transparency and commitment from the landscape, it is 
unlikely that technical innovation built up at the niche level will influence regime 
behaviour. As the NI approach indicates that institutions often present both varied and 
often divergent needs, there are key questions surrounding the extent to which policy 
expectations are accepted and understood by market-facing actors and whether 
sufficient policy coordination is in existence. 
2.! Change mobilisation: Change according to the MLP approach occurs when the 
varying layers of activity are mobilised collectively. This is however, coupled with a 
recognition that some systems display lock-in features and that change occurs primarily 
on an incremental basis. Significant emphasis has been placed on the role of lock-in 
within the NI literature, which affords a greater understanding of institutional resistance 
than provided by the MLP approach. This literature points to the slow evolution of 
institutions and the self-reinforcing and durable characteristics they display. This in turn 
means that any understanding of institutional transformation within the speculative 
housebuilding industry requires an acceptance of institutional norms and an exploration 
of the degree to which market-facing actors are positioned to respond to what may be 
non-conventional operating practices.  
3.! Constraint management: Although the MLP approach has asserted the key role of the 
regime level in delivering transformation, this has been accompanied by an awareness 
that there are significant tensions between the regime and niche levels which have been 
enhanced by an over-reliance on demonstration projects devoid of market realities and 
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a poor understanding of regime behaviour. NI theory enables us to develop a richer 
appreciation of housing market dynamics at the regime level by understanding how 
institutions typically respond to external pressures, how the wider modalities of market 
behaviour impact on trajectory and how differentiated responses might be accounted 
for. Questions which stem from this understanding relate to uncertainty regarding the 
wider constraints which impact upon market-facing actors and the degree to which such 
constraints might undermine genuine institutional change. 
 
4.! Methodology 
The methodological approach sought to examine the extent to which the speculative 
housebuilding industry can achieve institutional transition in response to Government policy 
on zero carbon homes. As part of this research, significant emphasis was placed not only on 
housebuilding actors, but also the wider systems and process of which they are a part. Using 
the combined theoretical framework outlined in Table 2, three main research questions were 
developed around our clarity, change and constraint thesis: 
1.! Clarity: to what degree are policy expectations relating to low carbon transition 
accepted and understood by housing market actors? 
2.! Change: to what extent are housing market actors equipped to deliver innovation in 
response state led carbon interventions? 
3.! Constraint: what institutional constraints in market-led housing systems are limiting 
policy change and associated levels of effectiveness? 
Qualitative interviews were undertaken in two stages. Stage one targeted elite semi-structured 
interviews with group directors based in the head offices of the UKÕs 15 biggest volume 
housebuilders2 (by turnover) who together produced approximately 58% of all new homes in 
2015 (Housebuilder Media, 2016). Interviews were secured with Group Sustainability 
Directors, Group Development Directors or Group Technical Directors at 11 volume 
housebuilders and enabled the examination of how zero carbon housing policy is changing 
strategic approaches, business behaviours and product outcomes across England. 
Stage two sought to interrogate the stage one findings through a series of elite semi-structured 
roundtable discussions with directors at a range of third sector organisations and businesses 
with a stake in new housing delivery. Seven round table discussions were secured with directors 
involved in promoting the interests of spatial planning, market housebuilding, surveying, 
mortgage lending, green building and zero carbon building. A further roundtable was secured 
with a leading mortgage lender. The explicit purpose of these stakeholder roundtables was to 
                                                             
2 The organisational structure of the UKÕs 15 biggest speculative housebuilders is typically comprised of a Head 
Office, responsible for strategic direction and decision making, and Regional Divisions that operate across the 
UK from which land purchase, housing construction, marketing and sales activities take place. This research 
targeted interviews with Group Directors based at UK Head Offices to garner a strategic perspective on English 
zero carbon housing policy.    
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critically discuss the housebuilder position and gain insight from competing perspectives of the 
wider institutional system and processes of which housebuilders are a part. This enabled a rich 
perspective on clarity, change and constraint and yielded insights into the dynamics of regime 
change. Participants from both research stages have been anonymised at their request and no 
quotes are attributable.  
As stated in the introduction, the research was undertaken within a fluctuating policy context. 
This afforded the opportunity to gauge stakeholder perceptions and attitudes in response to 
changing parameters. Both the interviews and roundtable discussions were undertaken between 
October 2014 and May 2015, at a time when the 2014 QueenÕs Speech had confirmed 
legislation to allow for the creation of an allowable solutions scheme but before the official 
scrapping of the policy (DCLG, 2014a). The shifting nature of Government commitment during 
the duration of the policy is outlined in Table 2, which we have distilled into four key phases 
and called: target setting; technical realism; ambiguity; and, abandonment. 
 
Table 2: The Four Phases of English Zero Carbon Housing Regulation 
Phase Key Regulatory Measures  
Target Setting 
2006-2008 
¥! From 2016, all new homes to be zero carbon (DCLG, 2006a) 
¥! Progressive tightening of building regulations between 2006 and 2016 
¥! Introduction of the voluntary Code for Sustainable Homes (CSH) that aimed to 
reduce carbon emissions and promote higher standards of design than the 
building regulations (DCLG, 2006b) 
Technical 
Realism 
2008-2009 
¥! UK Green Building Council predict that up to 80% of new homes would be 
unable to meet the 2006 criteria due to technical and financial challenges of on-
site renewable energy (UK Green Building Council, 2008) 
¥! Onsite carbon compliance levels adjusted from 100% to 70% of energy use, with 
the remainder mitigated by a flexible Ôtop-upÕ mechanism called allowable 
solutions (DCLG, 2009) 
Ambiguity 
2010-2015 
 
¥! The zero carbon standard to cover only regulated emissions, effectively meaning 
only 66% of carbon is to be mitigated (DCLG, 2014a) 
¥! Continuing delay over definition and application of the allowable solutions 
mechanism 
¥! Small sites to be exempt from the zero carbon standard (DCLG, 2014b) 
¥! Government announces its intention to scrap CSH and instead enshrine some of 
its voluntary standards within building regulations (DCLG, 2014c) 
Abandonment  
2016 
¥! The 2006 zero carbon housing target is officially scrapped (HM Treasury, 2015) 
¥! The London Plan seeks to retain the target and require all new homes forming 
part of a major development to achieve at least 35% reduction in regulated 
carbon emissions with the remaining being offset through a cash contribution 
(The Draft London Plan, 2017) 
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5.! Results 
In this section, we present the results of our research around our three lines of enquiry: clarity 
of expectation, change mobilisation and constraint management. This enables us to address our 
three research questions and assess the degree to which the speculative housebuilding industry 
can achieve institutional transition in response to Government policy on zero carbon homes.  
5.1 Clarity  
Here, we address research question one - to what degree are policy expectations relating to low 
carbon transition accepted and understood by housing market actors - to determine whether 
sufficient policy coordination existed to enable regime-level behaviour change.  
The research indicates that technical innovation by housebuilders was hampered by the lack of 
policy articulation and coordination from government around its zero carbon message. 
Housebuilders reported deep frustrations with the policy ambiguity and regulatory uncertainty 
they had faced since the initial policy announcement in 2006 (see Table 2). Housebuilders 
argued the lack of a clear policy framework with a common language and a clear timetable for 
achievable implementation had frustrated their longer-term strategic business planning, 
especially around their engagement in land markets, and had created difficulties in predicting 
what issues may emerge as a result. One housebuilder noted: 
 ÒÉ weÕre making decisions that we might buy a piece of land today that 
we might be on for ten years. And how do you then build in costs to that if 
theyÕre going to move the goalposts every two years?Ó 
This regulatory uncertainty was further compounded by the 2015 general election, during 
which the main political parties adopted divergent zero carbon messages. This created 
difficulties for housebuilders in determining and preparing for potential policy trajectories, as 
another housebuilder noted:  
ÒÉat the moment itÕs just as it was a couple of years ago, itÕs a complete 
messÉyouÕve got the Coalition at one end and the Labour Party at 
completely the opposite end of the spectrumÉ we thought we had a path to 
2016 but the Labour Manifesto has now just made that very difficult to map 
outÓ 
One implication of this political battle over the importance of zero carbon housing regulation 
that concerned a number of housebuilders was the possible need for technical firefighting in 
product design to meet rushed regulation developed by an incoming government seeking to fill 
the regulatory void. Interestingly, this was considered a particularly unfair proposition by the 
green building stakeholder because it potentially disadvantaged those housebuilders who had 
invested in pilot projects and exemplar schemes to meet existing regulations. The green 
building stakeholder noted:  
ÒÉ then the brackets [are] pulled out from under them and suddenly you 
donÕt need to do that anymore. And itÕs really frustratingÉ that was kind of 
the original deal between government and housebuildersÓ 
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This section has revealed how policy and political uncertainty affected the ways in which 
housebuilders prepared and planned for regulatory change in respect of zero carbon housing 
policy and frustrated longer-term business planning around strategic and technical innovations.       
5.2 Change 
Research question two considered the extent to which housing market actors are equipped to 
deliver innovation in response state led carbon interventions. In what follows, we reveal that 
housebuilders may accept change, but require convincing solutions that are market friendly to 
overcome the durable characteristics they currently display.   
The interviews revealed that housebuilders had undertaken a range of exploratory research and 
development exercises to explore a series of technical innovations to meet the range of policy 
requirements set out by government since 2006 (see Table 2). This involved housebuilders 
experimenting with a range of innovative renewable technologies advanced by their supply 
chains, as well as exploring fabric-based material upgrades to existing house types. A small 
number of housebuilders interviewed had worked together in consortiums on government-
funded exemplar schemes to test build some of these design solutions. However, they were 
keen to point out these innovative products faced a range of cost and technological constraints 
that challenged their conventional standardised approach to product design and mass 
production, which they were resolutely unwilling to compromise on. Nearly all housebuilders 
interviewed were reluctant to extensively incorporate innovative renewable technologies 
advanced by their supply chains for reasons of long term technical and performance efficacy, 
supply chain capacity, consumer utility or ongoing maintenance and servicing needs. As such, 
housebuilders revealed they were actively working towards technical solutions that were both 
practical and cost effective, as one housebuilder stated:    
ÒÉ we need something we can manage easily on-site bearing in mind the 
volumes that weÕre doing as a business, we donÕt want to create something 
which is too difficultÓ 
This dominant modus operandi of seeking cost effective and practical solutions to meet the 
carbon target meant housebuilders focused on a strategy of minimal adjustment to their existing 
portfolio of standardised house types in place of technical innovations or entirely new design 
responses. This fabric-first approach involved upgrading the fabric of existing house types with 
more efficient window and insulation types to meet equivalent Code for Sustainable Homes 
(CSH) 4 requirements, meaning housebuilders could Ôlock inÕ enhanced efficiency measures 
to the existing building fabric, thus maintaining standardised design and mass production 
methods and securing cost effectiveness. 
This approach by housebuilders garnered some criticism from the zero carbon housing 
stakeholder, who condemned the industryÕs reliance on incremental change and its reluctance 
to utilise renewable technologies or innovative design solutions or to develop new production 
models. However, the green building stakeholder conceded the business logic of incremental 
change, acknowledging that housebuildersÕ confidence in the governmentÕs seriousness about 
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zero carbon homes had been eroded due to policy ambiguity. They instead called upon 
government to drive the agenda forward:   
ÒÉ what government needs to more than anything is just say this is a 
serious issue that you need to deal with and then I think they can also help 
by lending their support to industry initiativesÓ 
The announcement of an allowable solutions mechanism in the 2014 QueenÕs Speech marked 
a watershed in the policy evolution of zero carbon homes. With this mechanism, housebuilders 
were able to achieve policy compliance with their CSH 4 equivalent fabric upgrades and offset 
any additional carbon by monetary means. The mechanism thus eliminated the need for further 
technical or fabric innovations to achieve truly zero carbon homes and was therefore more 
sensitive to commercial and market practices than previous iterations of the policy had been. 
Given the allowable solutions mechanism reduced most of the technical and cost constraints 
that housebuilders had earlier experienced, it was, according to the green building stakeholder 
ÒÉkind of a pressure release valve for the policyÓ enabling the housebuilder to be ÒÉthe 
driver and they will decide which of the options or routes they can takeÓ. However, 
housebuilders remained concerned over the prevailing cost and administrative uncertainty of 
allowable solutions payments, yet to be defined at the time of interview, as one housebuilder 
commented: 
ÒÉwe made the point very strongly that we needed the allowable solutions 
mechanisms to be in place nearly a year and a half ago. And here we are 
you know approaching 2015 and that is not in place yetÓ 
These criticisms levied at the government by the housebuilding industry serve to highlight the 
primacy housebuilders place on incremental adjustment in response to carbon regulation and 
in particular, their need for an appropriate degree of space to plan for and adapt to such change. 
Despite this prevailing uncertainty, housebuilders generally commented positively on the 
eventual impact of an allowable solutions payment, as one housebuilder noted: 
ÒÉI donÕt have a problem with itÉ by a simple calculation I know how 
much money I will have to pay to have that as an allowable solution. So, I 
pay that money to the Bank of Carbon, the Bank of Carbon write me a 
letter saying IÕve paid and we carry onÉ business as usualÓ 
Beyond the technical feasibility issues highlighted by housebuilders as a cause for resisting 
non-conventional forms of design and construction, the research also revealed that the global 
financial crisis and recessionary experience (see Payne 2015), together with the ongoing 
uncertainty in the macroeconomy, skills and materials markets and mortgage finance markets, 
had further dampened housebuildersÕ strategic, design and technical ambitions around carbon 
reduction. For housebuilders, this institutional turbulence had amplified the prevailing viability 
issues associated with delivering policy-compliant product and process innovations. This was 
a view shared by the zero carbon building stakeholder, who went as far as to suggest that Ò...if 
the market had kept lifting and lifting and lifting, [housebuilders] would have rolled out more 
ambitious standards earlier because there would have been that wiggle roomÓ.  
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However, housebuilders actively capitalised on this institutional turbulence to argue for a 
scaling back of the governmentÕs carbon regulation ambitions. In particular, housebuilders 
noted how the recession and the historical undersupply of new homes had Ôhelped the 
conversationÕ with government about their viability concerns of achieving the technical 
innovations necessary to achieve mass production of zero carbon homes. One housebuilder 
revealed the nature of their discussions with government:  
ÒBut ultimately, now this is for me the crux of the matter, you [the 
government], want me to deliver a CSH6 home and itÕs going to cost 
£40,000. ItÕs not me saying it, itÕs your [the governmentÕs] advisors saying 
that. If a home costs me £80,000 to build, for every one that IÕm going to 
build youÕre going to lose a half for your zero carbon policy. You want 
250,000 homes a year, we currently can only deliver 120,000, so actually 
itÕs not 120,000, IÕm going to give you 90,000 homes a year because your 
zero carbon policy is expensiveÓ 
The green building stakeholder conceded this point and was sympathetic to the difficulties 
housebuilders faced in changing their conventional and well-honed business practices in a 
volatile operating environment, pointing to the housing marketÕs boom and bust nature as an 
inherent constraint in housebuildersÕ business planning for long-term investment and change.    
A number of housebuilders admitted they had always expected the 2016 zero carbon target to 
be pushed back or watered down due to the significant changes that were being asked of them 
in a relatively short space of time. They highlighted the governmentÕs flawed expectations 
around the costs and technical feasibility of achieving the target within the particularly volatile 
post-recession housing market. One housebuilder revealed they, like other housebuilders 
interviewed, had actively made that point to government during meetings that the zero carbon 
housing policy failed to understand and accommodate the industryÕs incremental approach 
toward policy adaptation: 
ÒÉit was too big of a step in one goÉweÕre going to do all that 
overnightÉ? You know, it sounds great in principle but in reality, no other 
industry, or not that I can think of, would go that big of a step in one goÓ 
In summary, this section has shown how the primacy housebuilders attached to conventional 
business practices around design and product standardisation suggests a deep resistance to 
unproved forms of innovation. This means housebuilders may accept change but require 
convincing solutions that are market friendly to overcome the durable characteristics they 
currently display.   
5.3 Constraint 
Finally, we address our third research question - what institutional constraints in market-led 
housing systems are limiting policy change and associated levels of effectiveness - and examine 
the extent to which the wider modalities of market behaviour conditioned housebuilder 
responses to carbon regulation. We also report on some recommendations that housebuilders 
and stakeholders suggested many overcome these market dynamics.      
16 
 
The interviews revealed that the significant additional costs housebuilders faced in delivering 
policy-compliant zero carbon homes could not, in their view, be captured elsewhere in the 
housing development process as added value because the market mechanisms they argued were 
necessary to achieve this - consumer demand and valuation and lending practices - did not exist. 
Housebuilders argued these market-based constraints had curbed their ambitions of producing 
truly innovative products deliverable at mass scale because of this cost / value imbalance. 
Whereas some housebuilders interviewed were actively involved in niche exemplar schemes, 
they were quick to emphasise their niche technical solutions were not readily transferable to 
market-based mass production methods. This was mainly due to their exemplar schemes being 
free from land and housing market constraints owing to government funding support but also 
due to the lack of market testing of consumer appetite for such technical innovations.  
Housebuilders were particularly keen to point out the lack of market signals for zero carbon 
homes. They perceived their consumers as being unwilling to pay a premium for a more energy 
efficient home or consider energy efficiency as a significant purchasing decision, as one 
housebuilder commented: 
ÒWe still see the problem of that being a cost where youÕre not going to see 
any benefit coming back the other way in terms of the purchaserÕs 
perception. And potentially then seeing any uplift because you are 
providing a better product. ItÕs not necessarily perceived as thatÓ 
This meant from a business perspective, housebuilders remained unwilling to develop further 
technical innovations because they offered no strategic advantage against their competitors, as 
another housebuilder candidly revealed: 
ÒThere is no strategic advantage and if there were weÕd all be doing it 
already. We wouldnÕt need regulation; we wouldnÕt need government 
intervention. If I can sell a home for more money than you I will do it and if 
that means because I can sell it as zero carbon, IÕd already be doing itÓ 
Housebuilders noted their difficulties in attempts to convert energy efficiency innovations into 
a clear value to enhance their ability to capture the cost premium of low carbon homes. They 
asserted that the housing market is currently not configured to respond to these advancements 
because quantifying energy savings or energy bill reductions could lead to litigious claims over 
mis-selling, as one housebuilder revealed: 
ÒItÕs very difficultÉ give somebody a bill for what the running costs are 
going to be because youÕre then hamstrung. And with the age of litigation 
that weÕre in, youÕre going to have somebody saying Ôyou told me the 
wrong figure, you told me it was going to cost £3.72 and itÕs costing me 
£3.75 a week. I want some compensationÕ. And so I think we remain wary 
of doing things like thatÓ 
Indeed, housebuilders were keen to emphasise the important role of consumer behaviour in 
determining the actual energy used and thus acting to constrain their willingness to advertise 
enhanced energy efficiency. In contrast, the green building stakeholder argued housebuilders 
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should be driving the low carbon housing market through better marketing practices, to offer 
more information about reduced energy costs. 
Beyond consumer demand and consumer behaviour, housebuilders also reported valuation and 
lending practices as significant constraining factors on their ability to create and realise 
additional value from the zero carbon housing market. In particular, housebuilders argued there 
was, at the time of interview, no market mechanism available to them to realise the additional 
value such properties may yield because the savings on energy bills were immaterial in the 
valuation process. Until this changed, housebuilders were adamant they were unable to bring 
such properties to market, as one housebuilder argued:  
ÒÉ So we find it very difficult to see how if lenders and valuers do not 
recognise that additional value, then I donÕt see how we canÓ 
When we discussed this with a leading mortgage lender, they revealed why incorporating 
reduced utility costs into their affordability calculations was limited by consumer behaviour 
and lifestyle: 
 ÒWe still are in the same situation where there is insufficient evidence for 
this to make lending underwriting decisions based on those efficiencies and 
therefore we couldnÕt say that weÕre in a position where we could lend 
extra money to a customer because they have bought a particular type of 
environmentally-friendly propertyÓ  
The mortgage lending stakeholder supported this position, pointing out that, in their view, 
lenders do not see energy efficient houses as a different market to lend against when compared 
to other new or second-hand homes. They too emphasised the role of the consumer in driving 
the development of this new market through their willingness to value energy efficiency as an 
important aspect of house purchasing. The surveying stakeholder agreed, arguing that valuers 
were not responsible for driving new markets and therefore had a limited role to play in 
stimulating both developer appetite and consumer demand for zero carbon homes. 
In our discussions with housebuilders and stakeholders about ways to overcome these market 
constraints, we received a varied set of recommendations, which largely coalesced around the 
need for an accelerator to get consumers to buy-in to the concept of zero carbon homes to: a) 
drive market demand; and b) enable additional costs to be recouped as enhanced value. Indeed, 
the zero carbon building stakeholder candidly revealed the need for more market-based ÔpullÕ 
factors rather than the current sole focus on ÔpushingÕ housebuilders to deliver technical 
innovations, stating: 
 ÒÉuntil that valuation model changesÉ I think weÕre kind of stuffed in a 
way. And it sounds like IÕm a housebuilder but the more IÕve listened to 
them, the more IÕve thought about itÉ and I donÕt see how you can really 
create pull and pull is what we need. ThereÕs enough push, it only goes so 
farÓ 
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Housebuilders concurred with this pull mentality, suggesting that, despite lenders not 
recognising the additional value of these products, ÒÉ being able to deliver preferential rates 
through acknowledging the reduced kind of running costsÓ, would be a positive step forward. 
Other stakeholders also emphasised the role of pull factors in triggering a change in consumer 
perceptions by better reflecting the energy savings of zero carbon homes. The green building 
stakeholder highlighted ÒÉinterest rates on the mortgagesÉ council taxÉ stamp dutyÓ as 
possible ways of triggering a change in consumer perception whereas, the market housebuilder 
stakeholder suggested connecting mortgages or council tax to energy performance certificates 
to make people pay more attention to the energy efficiency of the houses they were buying. 
The mortgage lending stakeholder concurred with the idea of council tax reduction.   
However, the leading mortgage lender was keen to reiterate the limited scope for changes to 
mortgage lending practices resulting from energy efficiency due to the dynamics of consumer 
behaviour toward house purchase decision making. In their mind, the primacy of location 
prevents homeowners buying just for efficiency. They suggested tax incentives for promoting 
energy efficiency as a primary factor in house purchase decision making could be effective.    
This section has revealed how the wider market dynamics within which housebuilders operate 
act to constrain their ability to capture the additional cost of zero carbon homes through added 
value. Our research indicates that the housing market as a whole needs to adapt and change, 
accounting for the dynamic and complex institutional relations within which policy change is 
situated and that a single pathway-based approach locked onto ÔpushingÕ housebuilders wonÕt 
work if additional ÔpullÕ mechanism are absent. Whilst there was some disagreement from the 
stakeholders as to the precise nature of these pull mechanisms, a general consensus on the role 
of the consumer in driving demand for zero carbon houses was evident. Such views seem to 
chime with previous industry thinking. The CBI (2015) argue for a more effective policy 
framework for encouraging consumers to value and pursue energy efficient homes through 
consistent and effective incentives. This, they suggest, would enable industry to invest against 
the policy and regulatory framework to create a market for energy efficient measures. Similarly, 
the Zero Carbon Hub (Zero Carbon Hub, 2010) argue for a greater consumer-centric 
perspective and call for ÔÉa clear, beneficial and recognisably secure sales proposition, 
reflecting innovation rather than riskÕ (p. 3), as being central to successful market housing 
development.  
  
6.! Discussion 
The above results provide a unique insight into the challenges being experienced by market-
facing actors within the low carbon transition. Although the built environment has increasingly 
become the subject of regulatory interventions centred on carbon reduction (Bulkeley et al., 
2010; Hodson et al., 2013; Carter et al., 2015) there has, to date, been limited research which 
explores the tensions that these expectations place upon those market actors targeted for reform. 
Our research has addressed this gap. Through our focus on the English housing market, we 
have explored the extent to which housebuilders have recalibrated their business strategies and 
behaviour in response to the GovernmentÕs target for zero carbon homes. As the target and 
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associated apparatus draws on the hybrid characteristics of both eco-state restructuring and 
ecological modernisation (Janicke, 1986; Huber, 2010; While, 2010; Goodchild and Walshaw, 
2011), we have shown how housebuilders were placed in an uncertain institutional environment 
where innovation was expected within strictly controlled regulatory parameters. Through the 
use of theories drawn from transition management (Geels and Schott, 2007; Rip and Kemp, 
2008) and new institutionalism (Jordan et al, 2003; March and Olsen, 2009), we have presented 
an understanding of the opportunities and constraints experienced by housebuilders in the 
search for regulatory compliance and have offered a unique insight into the institutional 
dynamics and interactions of market-led housing systems within the low carbon transition, 
which was otherwise absent in the literature.   
Our research reveals that housebuilders responded to policy expectations centred around zero 
carbon housing in two phases. The first phase saw housebuilders engage with research and 
development in new technology and liaise with actors driving exemplar schemes. The second 
witnessed housebuilders operating in an increasingly uncertain policy environment in which 
they felt compelled to explore fabric-first design solutions and experiment with allowable 
solutions to offset carbon outputs. Neither phase delivered the level of institutional 
transformation expected by the Government. One possible interpretation of this policy failure 
is that the zero carbon housing target failed to gain traction, as ambiguity at the landscape scale 
destabilised momentum gained within the niche. We suggest however, that whilst there is 
evidence to support this, the situation is more complex and has as much to do with regime 
interactions and dynamics as it does landscape and niche pressure. 
It is certainly arguable that housebuilders were both aware and party to technological 
innovations being developed by the niche. Yet, in the majority of cases, interviewees expressed 
concerns not only over the technical viability of solutions, but the conditions in which they 
were tested. The research indicated that a significant proportion of innovations had been 
developed as demonstration projects under artificial market conditions. In many cases, such 
schemes were funded directly by Government and thus were free of normal market conditions.  
Our findings are consistent with earlier critiques of the role of the niche in achieving 
transformation, which have drawn attention to the failure of the niche to offer solutions which 
can be accommodated by the regime (Schott and Geels, 2008; Syefeng, 2010; Killip, 2013). In 
the case of the English housebuilding industry, there appears to be a clear mismatch between 
notions of innovation on the one hand and acceptability amongst wider stakeholders on the 
other. The difficulty of translating consumer preferences into price signals and the ability of 
lenders and valuers to accommodate such prices suggests that innovation is interpreted by 
wider housing market actors as a form of enhanced risk. On this basis, regime breakthrough 
(Killip, 2013) is likely to require an enhanced appreciation of the role of market uncertainty 
faced by those actors entrusted with carbon transformation. 
In much the same way that our research has served to reveal tensions in the relationship 
between niche and regime, it is also apparent that the ability of the landscape to apply pressure 
on the regime (Smith et al., 2005; Geels and Scott, 2007; Rip and Kemp, 2008) is open to 
reinterpretation. The gradual process of regulatory retreat and repositioning by the Government 
in its attempt to introduce carbon limits is suggestive of both regime-level resistance and a 
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failure to identify institutional pathways grounded in an appreciation of institutional structures 
and processes. Our research asserts that market-facing institutions are indeed sticky (March 
and Olsen, 1989) and that much of the failure of the zero carbon housing experiment rests in 
over confidence in market flexibility. The process of achieving transformation is therefore 
revealed as one which is not so much dependant on the ability to unlock institutions as an 
appreciation of the incremental nature of institutional change (North 1990). Although the 
development of an allowable solutions mechanism was seen as both reactive and poorly 
coordinated, it did demonstrate a reluctant recognition that change would need to accommodate 
conventional forms of business practice and the role played by design standardisation and mass 
production. 
What does this mean for the regime? Earlier in the paper, we suggested that unless market 
forces are able to drive change towards low carbon housing futures, housebuilders may find 
little reason to shift conventional production processes and adopt innovative technical solutions. 
Drawing on the work of transition theorists (Schot and Geels, 2008; Killip, 2013; Geels, 2014) 
we argued that more attention needed to be paid to the dynamics of regime behaviour in order 
to challenge the monolithic and isolationist interpretations of regime operations and explain 
why regime breakthrough may not occur within the timeframes set by the landscape. Our 
research on the English housing market supports this proposition and reveals complex 
institutional configurations and interests at play. These emphasise the resilience of institutions 
and a resistance to unproven forms of intervention mobilised by the landscape on the one hand 
and by the niche on the other. Our research therefore indicates that a narrow focus on the 
technical challenges of determining whether zero carbon housing futures can be achieved (see 
Osmani and OÕReilly 2009) neglects the complexities of institutional arrangements present 
within the regime. We suggest that achieving low carbon housing futures is not simply about 
targeting dominant market actors and attempting to push innovation through strictly controlled 
regulatory parameters. Rather, the mobilisation of change at the regime must involve an 
understanding of the role that disparate or otherwise incumbent market actors (in our case 
consumers, lenders and valuers) can potentially play in pulling dominant market actors towards 
achieving policy goals set by the landscape. Change can be acceptable and achievable if 
convincing solutions based around existing market structures and practices are mobilised with 
appropriate degrees of space afforded to key market actors.  
It is arguable that this form of mobilisation might be achieved by giving greater prominence to 
regime dynamics within transition experimentation. This paper has offered fresh insights into 
the structure and character of regime behaviour within the English housebuilding sector 
through the assertion of the role played by institutional dynamics and interactions. Such 
insights go some way towards recalibrating and redirecting both political expectation and 
transition experiments driven by niche-level actors. Our findings show that housebuilders were 
prepared to engage with carbon-centred coalitions and projects, but that a mandate of 
technological testing over emphasised the role of ÔpushÕ rather than ÔpullÕ factors. In line with 
perspectives offered by scholars who have advocated the significance of social learning with 
transition experimentation (Evans and Karvonen, 2011; Bos and Brown, 2012; Bulkeley and 
Broto, 2012; Bulkeley et al., 2013), we suggest that the promotion of coalitions which provide 
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adequate appreciation of institutional functionality, may go some way to encouraging 
behavioural shifts. We see these as distinct from demonstration projects geared towards the 
promotion of technical feasibility. 
If such approaches to low carbon transition are to be successful, we suggest that a number of 
criteria will need to be met. Firstly, political choices about goal orientation and the timescales 
for delivery will need to be both realistic and formed on a reflexive understanding of needs, 
values and capabilities (Meadowcroft (2009; 2011). Secondly, experimental coalitions will 
need to be inclusive and representative of real world actors (Bos and Brown; 2012). In 
particular there is a key role for third sector organisations in brokering niche/regime 
interactions. Studies in the UK (Hodson and Marvin, 2012) and the Netherlands (Kemp et al, 
2007; Loorbach, 2007; Kern and Smith, 2008) have shown that where such conditions have 
not been met, they have either failed to gain wider societal traction or have allowed the regime 
to re-appropriate the niche under the illusion of transition. 
 
7.! Conclusion 
This paper has explored how institutionally-constituted market behaviours shape pathways and 
transitions towards low carbon futures. It has questioned the extent to which market-facing 
actors within the built environment are adequately positioned to respond to increasing levels 
of state regulation centred on carbon reduction. Through a focus on EnglandÕs zero carbon 
housing policy, we have identified a range of opportunities and constraints which need to be 
addressed in considering the transformative potential of market-facing institutions in the low 
carbon transition. The research undertaken for the paper has shown that the English zero carbon 
housing experiment ultimately failed to achieve its aim. This was due to a number of factors. 
These included an over-emphasis on the utility of technological demonstration projects, the 
limited appreciation of the relationship between valuation and market acceptance, and more 
importantly, the time it took to recognise the incremental nature of policy adaptation. 
Our findings challenge widely help assumptions about the capacity of the market to act in 
response to target-based interventions under a low carbon transition. We instead draw attention 
to the need to understand actor behaviour within the wider context of institutional dynamics 
and wider market modalities. By using EnglandÕs housing system to examine market-based 
complexity in the low carbon transition, our research offers valuable insights to other market-
led housing systems (e.g. the US, Canada and other devolved UK regions), who rely on market 
practices in urban development. Moreover, our research is useful to future theoretical and 
empirical analyses of low carbon transition in alternative institutional settings (such as 
transport, energy and manufacturing), particularly those examining disaggregated approaches 
to target setting (e.g. The Draft London Plan, 2017).     
Although we welcome the overarching policy goals associated with low carbon transition and 
maintain that the market can play a key role in delivery, we ultimately call for a revised 
understanding of how market-dependent actors can be engaged. We suggest that future 
regulatory interventions associated with carbon reduction need to allow for greater flexibility 
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in market responses in order to allow for the incremental nature of institutional change. 
Furthermore, there needs to be recognition that market transformation will be dependent on 
taking a more plural approach to collaboration. On this basis, we argue that future research on 
low carbon transformation might consider the roles that can be played by perspectives centred 
on incremental policy adjustment, enhanced market synergies and a broader interpretation of 
actor inclusion within state-market coalitions.   
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